A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action by Chamberlin, John R.
Articles 
A DIAGRAMMATIC 
EXPOSITION OF THE LOGIC 
OF COLLECTION ACTION 
John R. Chamberlin, - 
During the decade since the appearance of  Mancur Olson's The Logic of 
Collective Action, a number of  economists and political scientists have focused 
their efforts on, further developing the model  of  group behavior analyzed by 
Olson. 1 While these efforts have contr ibuted to both the precision and the 
generality o f  the theory of  collective action, the theory remains a somewhat loosely 
connected set of  verbal and graphical assertions about g roup  behavior, and the 
central results of  the theory have not all been demonstrated using the same 
analytical style. This paper at tempts  to remedy this deficiency in some major 
respects. 2 In addit ion to analyzing the relationship between group size and the 
voluntary provision of  public goods, which is the focus of  Olson's work, this paper 
carries out  similar analyses of  the relationship between the provision o f  public 
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1The most important works which use the style of analysis of the present paper (indiffer- 
ence curve analysis) are those of Chambertin (1974), McGuire (1974), and Olson and Zeckhauser 
(1966). 
2The analysis here is restricted to a set of identical individuals, and thus does not address 
the issue of the equity of burden sharing discussed by Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhata~er 
(1966). The analysis is also restricted to the case of pure public goods which are normal goods 
for all individuals. For analyses of the cases of inferior public goods and impure public goods, 
see Chamberlin (1974) and McGuire (I974). 
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goods and three other important parameters of the problem, the wealth of a group, 
the price of the public good, and the intensity of the individuals' preferences for 
the public good. The analysis is made particularly easy to follow because of a result 
discussed in the Appendix which enables the analysis of both Cournot and Pareto 
optimal behavior using the same graph. I t is  hoped that this method of presentation 
will contribute to a consolidation of the theory of collective action and will also 
make the theory more easily accessible to the average reader. 
The basic model of group behavior used by Olson is one of Cournot behavior 
in the presence of a public good. In this model, each individual attempts to 
maximize his satisfaction, taking the behavior of others as given. The Cournot 
equilibrium is characterized by a set of actions based on a set of expectations 
converning others' actions that result in everyone's expectations being met. The 
Cournot equilibrium is in this sense equivalent to a Nash equilibrium if the problem 
is viewed as a non-cooperative game. Two properties of Cournot behavior which are 
of particular interest are the amount of the public good provided through such 
behavior and the difference between the amount provided through Cournot 
behavior and the amount which would be provided if the optimality conditions of 
the economic theory were to be met. 
The optimality conditions require that the marginal costs of producing the 
public good be shared among its consumers in proportion to the marginal benefits 
received. From the infinite set of cost sharing plans which result in a Pareto optimal 
allocation a particular one will be used in the analysis below, that suggested by 
Lindahl. The Lindahl scheme is a quasi-market scheme, in which consumers are 
charged the same price for all units of the public good, just as in the case of a 
private good, although the prices charged consumers will normally be different 
because of different evaluations of marginal benefits. In addition, the Lindahl 
scheme does not involve lump sum redistribution of income. 3 The analysis below 
will compare the Cournot and Lindahl equilibria as a function of several important 
attributes of groups (size, wealth, price of the public good, and intensity of 
prefernce for the public good). 
I. The Basic Model 
Consider a group of n identical individuals, each endowed with an identical 
budget (of amount w.). There exist two goods, a private good Y with unitary price 
and a pure public good X with price p. The preferences of an individual are 
represented by the indifference curves as shown in Figure 1. The budget constraint 
is given by line AB, and the individual's optimal consumption is located at E, the 
point of tangency between the budget constraint and indifference curve 12. Now 
suppose another individual were to provide an amount K-bf the public good. 
Because of the non-exclusion property of public goods, this amount is 
3See Musgrave (1959) or Head (1974) for a discussion of the properties of the Lindahl 
equilibrium. 
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Figure I. Income-Consumption Curve 
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automatically available to the first individual. This has the effect of shifting the 
vertical axis in Figure 1 to the right by an amount E, The budget line is also shifted 
to the right by the amount ~, since the individual now consumes this amount of the 
public good without having to pay for it. This action by the other individual has the 
effect of increasing the first individuaI's income by an amount AC, and he is free to 
allocate his income as he chooses so long as he consumes at leastan amount ~ of 
the public good. The individual's optimal consumption is now at E, and he pays for 
an amount (xl-x-) of the public good. If alI possible amounts of the public good 
provided by others (up to an amount Xs) were considered, the locus of the 
individual's optimal consumption would be the line EE', which is part of the 
individual's "income-consumption" curve. If others provide an amount of the 
public good greater than or equal to Xs, the individual will devote his entire budget 
to the purchase of the private good, as indicated by the horizontal line E' E". The 
analysis below will take into consideration only the portion EE' of the locus of the 
individual's optima. 
In addition to the individual's responses to increases in his income brought 
about by the provision of the public good by others, the analysis below will also 
make use of the individual's responses to variations in the price of the public good 
(brought about by an agreement among the individuals involved to share the costs 
of providing the public good). Figure 2 shows a portion of the "price-consumption" 
curve for the individual, which is the locus of the individual's optimal consumption 
as the price he is charged for the public good declines. 
Figure 3 shows the relevant positions of the income and price-consumption 
• • • 4 . . . .  curves and the ongmal budget hne. In addmon, a new budget hne is shown, 
corresponding to a price of p/n for the public good. This budget line would result if 
the individuals were to share equally the costs of providing the public good. It is 
shown in the Appendix that the amounts of the public good provided under 
Cournot and Lindahl behavior are those associated with the allocations E C and EL, 
respectively. The Cournot equilibrium occurs where the income-consumption curve 
intersects the budget line (with price p/n for the public good), and the Lindahl 
equilibrium occurs where the price-consumption curve intersects this same budget 
line. The amounts provided at these equilibria are XEc and XEL, respectively, The 
degree of suboptimatity associated with Cournot behavior is measured by (XEL - 
XEc). 
The Cournot Equilibrium 
The following properties of the Cournot equilibrium can be deduced from 
Figure 3: 
4The anatysis below is restricted to the case where neither good is an inferior good, This 
means that in Figure 3 B is above and t.o the right of A and that C is to the right of A. The 
price-consumption curve always Iies below the income-consumption curve. 
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1) X E increases as group size (n), wealth (w), and intensity of  preference 
inc~ase 5 
2) XEC decreases as the price of  the public good (p) increases. 
With the exception of  the relationship between group size X E , these conclusions 
are obvious to anyone familiar with the basic model of  consumer choice. 6 They are 
listed here only for completeness and because the discussion below will consider the 
relationship between these variables and the degree o f  suboptimality associated 
with Cournot behavior, as measured by (XEL - XEc  ). 
5For the analysis below, one individual will be said to have a greater intensity of 
preference for the public good than another individual if the income-consumption and 
price-consumption curves for the first individual lie below and to the right of those for the 
second individual. That is, at all levels of wealth (w) and at all prices (p), the more intense 
individual will allocate a greater proportion of his budget to the public good. 
6The result conc*rning the relationship between group size and XEc has been shown by 
Chamberlin (1'974) and McGuire (1974). 
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The Degree of  Suboptimality 
Since in Figure 3 the curve AC must always lie belox¢ c ~ v e  AB, it is always 
true that is less than That is, as Olson argued, Cournot behavior results XE C XE L" 
in the suboptimal provision of  a public good. The following conclusions concerning 
the degree of  suboptimality can be deduced from Figure 3: 
3) the more elastic the demand for the public good, the greater the degree 
of  suboptimality (XEL - X E c  ). 
4) the more income elastic the demand for the public good, the less the 
degree of  suboptimality. 
IL Variations in Group Size 
Figure 4 shows the case of  two groups of  sizes n I and n2, where n I < n  2. The 
four equilibria are shown, where the superscripts refer to the groups. Another of  
Olson's central conclusions follows from Figure 4: 
5) (XEL1- XEc1 ) < ( X E 2 -  XE2); that is, the larger the group, the more 
suboptimal the provision of  the public good. 7 
III. Variations in l~ealth, Price and lntensity o f  Preference 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the cases of  two groups with different levels of  
wealth, prices for the public good and intensities of  preference respectively. 8 In 
each case, the nature of  indifference maps is such that no general conclusions can 
be reached concerning the relationship between these parameters and the degree of  
suboptimality associated with Cournot behavior. That  is, in Figure 5, the price- 
consumption curve A'C'  may be drawn quite arbitrarily, subject only to the con- 
straint that  it lie between curves AC and A'B'.  This freedom allows one to draw 
A'C'  in such a way that the degree of  suboptimality may be either greater or smaller 
for the wealthier group. In Figure 6, the income-consumption curve A'B'  has the 
same property.  Figure 7, showing different intensities of  preferences, allows an 
even greater arbitrariness in drawing the curves. Thus, in contrast with the case 
involving variation in group size, there exists no general relationship between 
7An additional assumption is necessary for this result, namely that in Figure 3, for all 
~lues of n, the slope of AB at E C is greater than the slope of AC at E L. The result follows 
directly from this assumption. The assumption is always met if demand for the public good is 
price-elastic~ but there could be cases of inelastic demand in which the assttmption is not met. I 
have been unable to determine whether there exists some "reasonable" class of preferences 
which fails to meet the assumption. 
8In the analysis of interest group behavior, the price of the public good indicates the rate 
at which individuals can transform private goods into effective political activity. Different 
prices facing two groups would be an indicatio~ of the fact that the group facing the 1Qwer 
price is more influential than the other group (can achieve the same change in the political 
outcome using fewer private resources). 
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Figure 5. Variation in Wealth 
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Figure 6. Var ia t ion  in Price 
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Figure 7. Variation in Intensity of Preference 
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wealth, price, and intensity of preference and the degree of suboptimality 
associated with Cournot behavior. 
IV, Analysis o f  a Special Case 
It is possible to find classes of indifference maps for which the ambiguity 
discussed above can be resolved. One such class consists of preferences which are 
representable by linear logarithmic utility functions, which take the form 
(X,Y) = k(ZXi)a(yi)fl U i 
where X i and Yi are the amounts of the public and private goods consumed by the 
i th individual, and k, 0z and fl are positive constants. These preferences are 
characterized by constant income elasticity (income-consumption curve is a straight 
line through the origin) and unitary price elasticity (horizontal price-consumption 
curve). I£ this utility function can be used to represent preferences, then an analytic 
solution of the problem can be substituted for the diagrammatic analysis used 
above. In this case, the utility function is maximized subject to the budget 
constraint 
PXi + Y'i _< w..t 
This yields the following provisions of public goods in the cases of Cournot (XEc) 
and Lindahl (XEL) behavior: 
0~W n 
XEc .... l~"((~÷Bn ) 
e~wn 
XEL = ~ " 
The degree of suboptimality is then given by 
~Swn ( n- 1 ) 
4 = XEL - XEc = p 
It is then easy to show that 
34 
- - >  0 8n 
o 
8w 
84 3p < 0  , 
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that is, that the degree of  suboptimality is an increasing function of group size and 
wealth, and a decreasing function of price. 
For the analysis of  the relationship between intensity of  preference and the 
degree of suboptimality, it is useful to define 
0~ ~ - - g  
yielding 
"¢k 
A -- (y+l )  (X+n)" 
wn(n-1) 
where k - P . ~¢ is then a measuryof intensity of  preference. One then finds 
that 
_- k(n-  2) 
(,¢+1) 2(,¢+n) 2 
BA 
' - -  2 & 0~ 
Tnus 0T ~> 0 if n > T  , that is, if n > (~)2 or ~ < v ~ F o r  large groups it seems 
reasonable that this inequality will hold, and that the degree of suboptimality will 
be an increasing function of intensity of  preference. Cases for which the inequality 
does not hold will presumably be of a life-or-death nature. 
Thus, for the case of  preferences representable by linear logarithmic utility 
functions, the degree of  suboptimality increases as group size and group wealth 
increases and decreases as the price of  the public good increases. The relationship 
between the degree of  suboptimality and intensity of  preference for the public 
good is not completely determined, and depends upon the relationship between 
group size and the intensity preference. The condition derived above, however, 
suggests that the degree of  suboptimality can usually be expected to increase as 
intensity of  preference increases. 9 
V. Summary 
This paper has investigated the relationships between two properties of  the 
provision of public goods through Cournot behavior (the amount of  the public 
good provided and the degree of  suboptimality relative to Pareto optimal behavior) 
and several important  parameters of  groups (size, wealth, price of  the public good, 
and the intensity of  preference for the public good). It has been shown that the 
amount of  the good provided through Cournot behavior increases as the size, 
9prafulla Joglekar has suggested as an alternative definition of the degree of 
suboptimality the ratio Z~/XEL; that is, the difference between the amounts of the good 
provided through Lindaht and Cournot behavior expressed as a percentage of the amount of the 
good provided through Lindahl behavior. For the case of linear logarithmic utility functions, 
the degree of suboptimality defined in this fashion increases as group size increases, decreases as 
intensity of preference increases, and is unaffected by changes in price and wealth. The choice 
of which definition one uses is arbitrary; the original measure was used here because it can be 
more easily depicted in the diagrammatic argument presented above. 
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with slope n/p intersects the transformed reaction curve R". Finally Figure 8D is 
derived by rotating Figure 8C 90 ° in a clockwise direction. When a new horizontal 
axis is added, it will be noted that Figure 8D is identical to Figure 3. The 
transformed reaction curve R" is the income-consumption curve, and E C (in 
Figures 3 and 8D) is the Cournot equilibrium since the total amount of the public 
good provided (x i = nX ) is (n/p) times the amount of money (pX E) spent by the 
individual on the public good, as in Figure 8C. 
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